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Abstract
We propose a general analytical framework to model the redistributive fea-
tures of alternative pension systems when individuals face ex ante differences
in mortality. Differences in life expectancy between high and low socioeco-
nomic groups are often large and have widened recently in many countries.
Such longevity gaps affect the actuarial fairness and progressivity of public
pension systems. However, behavioral responses to longevity and policy com-
plicate analysis of possible reforms. Here we consider how various pension
systems would perform in an OLG setting with heterogeneous longevity and
ability. We evaluate redistributive effects of three Notional Defined Contribu-
tion plans and three Defined Benefit plans, calibrated on the US case. Com-
pared to a benchmark non-redistributive plan that accounts for differences in
mortality, US Social Security reduces regressivity from longevity differences,
but would require group-specific life tables to achieve progressivity. More-
over, without separate life tables, despite apparent accounting gains, lower
income groups would suffer welfare losses and higher income groups would
enjoy welfare gains through indirect effects of pension systems on labor sup-
ply.
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Progressivity
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1 Introduction
There are large differences in mortality by socioeconomic status in rich industrial
nations and in some developing countries as well, according to a growing literature
which has also found that these differences have often widened in recent decades
(NASEM, 2015; OECD, 2016; Waldron, 2007; Bosworth et al., 2016; Chetty et al.,
2016; Rosero-Bixby and Dow, 2016; Rostron et al., 2010). While these increas-
ing inequalities in health are themselves an urgent and critically important problem
for policy, here we will focus on a different issue: These mortality differences in-
teract with government programs, particularly those for the elderly such as public
pensions, health care, and long term care. The economically advantaged groups
survive for more years than those with lower income, and thereby receive more
costly benefits from each of these programs. Unless tax and contribution struc-
tures, on the one hand, and benefit structures on the other, take such differences
into account the result can be a net transfer of income from the poor to the rich
through these programs. To the extent that programs are designed to be progres-
sive, and intended to redistribute income from rich to poor, these mortality differ-
ences will reduce or even reverse the direction of redistribution. Effects of this sort
on government programs in the United States were recently quantified and found
large (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2015; hence-
forth NASEM, 2015). For example, the widening of the longevity gap between
the top and bottom income quintile in the US raised the present value of lifetime
government benefits for the top quintile relative to the bottom by $132,000 for men
and by $157,000 for women (NASEM, 2015, :11). Consequences of this kind are
surely present in other countries as well, and have begun to draw broader atten-
tion (Holzmann et al., 2020; Ayuso et al., 2017; Lee and Sanchez-Romero, 2020;
OECD, 2016).
As populations age, the fiscal sustainability of government programs for the
elderly has been increasingly threatened, leading to strong pressures for policy ad-
justments now and in the near future. Potential policy adjustments, such as raising
the Normal Retirement Age for pensions or indexing each generation’s benefit level
to its remaining life expectancy, will have different effects on groups with different
mortality, effects that will increase if the mortality differences continue to widen.
The interactions of mortality differences with policy adjustments were also ana-
lyzed by the NASEM study, for selected program changes.
Analysis of these effects and interactions is far from straightforward, due both to
data limitations and to the likelihood of broader behavioral responses by individuals
to policies and to their own mortality risks. On the data side, assessments require
calculation of taxes and benefits over an entire adult lifetime in relation to mortality
differences across an entire lifetime. Since work often starts before age 20, and
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because many individuals survive past 100, analysis requires longitudinal data for
each generation over a span of something like 80 years, disaggregated by socioe-
conomic status. Such data are seldom if ever available. Empirical studies such as
NASEM (2015) have in practice been based on a mixture of observed, simulated
and projected data, reflecting many assumptions and introducing many uncertain-
ties, and even after these efforts data on some key variables may be unavailable for
parts of the lifecycle.
There are also difficult theoretical issues. Presumably these mortality differ-
ences are to some degree known to the actors, who then take them into account as
they formulate their lifecycle plans for education, consumption, saving, and retire-
ment, plans that are further complicated by individual differences in ability. Once
government programs are added to the picture, all sorts of new incentives and distor-
tions arise, with different effects for different longevity and ability groups. Analysis
of the redistributive effects of government programs must also consider the way that
these individual behavioral responses will affect the outcome.
In this paper we focus on public pensions rather than considering the whole
range of public programs for the elderly. We develop a model for a small open econ-
omy, the population of which exhibits heterogeneous ability and mortality leading
to differences in education, income, and retirement planning. Mortality differences
by long term earnings are based on the analysis in NASEM (2015), which here-
inafter we refer as the Report, and the parameters of our theoretical model are cal-
ibrated to match key aspects of the Report findings. We restrict our analysis to the
steady state and develop a general analytical framework of pension systems. Within
this framework we focus on redistributive effects of six different public pension sys-
tems: three Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) plans and three Defined Benefit
(DB) plans. An NDC pension system is a PAYG system which is designed to mimic
a standard Defined Contribution (DC) system, in the sense that participants make
mandatory contributions to a notional account that earns a rate of return stipulated
by the government, not determined by the stock market, and is generally chosen
to equal or be close to the sustainable rate of return that a PAYG system can pay
—that is, the growth rate of GDP or of the wage bill. ‘On retirement the participant
uses the notional account to purchase from the government an annuity based on a
similar rate of return and the remaining life expectancy, based on the life table for
the participant’s generation. The NDC system provides an actuarially fair tradeoff
between retirement and continuing to work, and it is expected that participants will
view these contributions as an investment rather than as a tax. An NDC system
should by design be approximately fiscally sustainable. In our analysis, one ver-
sion of these NDC and DB plans ignores mortality differences at retirement as do
all current programs. Another three versions —one NDC and two DB plans— dif-
fer in their approaches to structuring taxes/contributions or benefits so as to reduce
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or avoid the program inequities arising from differences in life expectancy, or to
achieve redistribution more generally. These five systems are compared to an ideal
NDC plan (our benchmark) in which both contributions and retirement benefits are
adjusted for the mortality of each group. For concreteness, our analysis draws in
various ways on the results of the Report for the US case, either with a core DB sys-
tem closely resembling that of the US, or a modified NDC system that shares some
quantitative features of the US case. In order to focus on the role of the mortality
differences, we simplify in various ways, including assuming that the systems are
in long term fiscal balance.
Our main findings stem from the behavioral responses arising from the differ-
ence in retirement age between NDC and DB plans. NDC systems minimize la-
bor market distortions by better linking contributions to pension benefits. Thus, in
NDC systems earlier or later retirement ages tend to be as neutral as possible to the
budget of the social security and the individual, since benefits are automatically ad-
justed according to the remaining years-lived in retirement. In contrast, DB systems
poorly link contributions to pension benefits as life expectancy increases. In order
to re-introduce actuarial fairness, DB pension systems apply penalties/rewards for
early/late retirement ages. However, when these penalties/rewards are not in line
with those that are actuarially fair, the pension system not only modifies retirement
behavior, but it also leads to a series of other behavioral responses that affect the
wealth and welfare of individuals. In particular, our estimates indicate that under
the mortality regime of the 1930 birth cohort in the US, individuals in the first three
income quintiles would have retired on average two years later in non-progressive
DB plans, and by one and a half years later in progressive DB plans, compared
to NDC plans. This difference in the retirement age raises the marginal benefit of
education in non-progressive DB plans. In contrast, despite the positive difference
in the retirement age between progressive DB plans and NDC plans, in progressive
DB plans the marginal benefit of education does not raise because these systems
impose a high effective tax on labor. We also find that in non-progressive DB sys-
tems the average increase in lifetime income is accompanied by a fall in lifetime
welfare, since the increase in lifetime income comes at the expense of less leisure
time during the working period and in retirement.
Throughout the article, we will focus on how the six public pension systems
redistribute income across income groups and how individuals respond to alterna-
tive pension settings and mortality regimes. The paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we detail the demographic characteristics of the population. In Sec-
tion 3 we set a general accounting framework for simultaneously analyzing NDC
and DB pension systems. In Section 4 we introduce a lifecycle model of labor sup-
ply in which individuals decide their education, hours worked, and the retirement
age. Details about assumptions, data used, and parameter values are provided in
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Section 5. The redistributive properties of each pension system by income quintile
under two mortality regimes are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. We
provide a detailed derivation of the economic model in the Appendix.
2 Demographics
We assume that the mortality of each individual is completely determined by their
lifetime income. We denote by I = {1, 2, . . . , I} the set of I income levels. Let
µi(t) ≥ 0 be the mortality hazard rate at age t of an individual of group i ∈ I.
Table 1 shows the life expectancy at ages 15, 50, and 65 for the US male cohorts
born in 1930 and 1960 based on the Report.1 The data shows that the difference
in life expectancy between the highest and the lowest quintiles is 6.5, 5.1, and 3.3
years at age 15, 50, and 65, respectively, for the birth cohort born in 1930. The
differences in life expectancy between these two income groups widens for the
cohort born in 1960 to 16.2, 11.9, 9.4 years. For details see Appendix A.
Table 1: Life expectancy at ages 15, 50, and 65 by income quintile, US males, birth
cohorts of 1930 and 1960
1930 birth cohort 1960 birth cohort
Life expectancy at Life expectancy at
Income level age 15 age 50 age 65 age 15 age 50 age 65
Quintile 1 56.3 25.6 15.0 55.6 25.1 14.7
Quintile 2 57.1 26.2 15.3 58.5 27.3 16.0
Quintile 3 58.3 27.1 15.9 65.1 32.4 19.7
Quintile 4 60.0 28.8 16.9 70.5 36.8 23.2
Quintile 5 62.8 30.7 18.3 71.7 37.8 24.1
Notes: Authors’ estimates based on data from the Report.
To simplify the demographic analysis, we assume each income group grows
steadily at a rate n and that the total number of births across income groups is
the same. These two assumptions imply that fertility is slightly higher for lower
1See https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as120/LifeTables_Body.html.
Note that the Report only gives life expectancy by income quintile by age 50. To obtain survival
probabilities below age 50 by income quintiles we use cohort-life tables from SSA. More specif-
ically, for each income quintile we choose the cohort-life table from SSA that best matches the
corresponding life expectancy at age 50 from the Report.
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income groups, to overcome the lower proportion of females surviving through the
reproductive ages.
3 The pension model
In order to provide comparable results across pension systems, we need a frame-
work that allows us to compare simultaneously all pension plans. For this purpose
we will use a pension point system, described below, that can reproduce both a de-
fined benefit (DB) system and a defined contribution (DC) system (see, for instance,
Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2006; OECD, 2005).
3.1 Parametric components
In order to keep the model as tractable as possible, we exclude disability benefits,
survivor benefits, and widowhood benefits. The pension system only pays benefits
to those workers who survive to retirement. Let us assume that workers contribute
an amount τy(t), where τ is the contribution rate and y(t) is the labor income
subject to payroll tax, for which workers gain pension points pp(t) that entitle them
to receive a pension benefit upon retirement. Suppose that workers earn φ pension
points per unit of social contribution paid. Pension points earn a rate of return
equal to an interest rate r˜ plus a mortality risk premium. The risk premium arises
because we exclude benefits from disability, survivorship, and widowhood. The
interest rate r˜ is assumed to be equal to or lower than the market interest rate, which
we denote by r. Most of the interest rates, or indexes, used in pension systems fit
into one of the following three cases: (i) when r˜ = 0, past contributions are only
adjusted for inflation; (ii) when r˜ = r, past contributions are invested in the market
and capitalized according to the interest rate r (i.e., funded system); and (iii) when
r˜ = n + g, where n is the population growth and g is the productivity growth rate,
then past contributions are capitalized according to the growth rate of the national
wage bill at the macro level, which corresponds to the intrinsic rate of return of a
PAYG pension system (Samuelson, 1958).2 The amount of pension points earned
depends on the system. In a DC system, they are equal to the contribution paid (i.e.,
φ = 1). In a DB system, they are equal to the yearly pension benefit accrual, which
is a fraction (φ = %/τ ) of the contributions paid (i.e., φτy = %y). Thus, the total
number of pension points accumulate over the working life according to
∂ppi(t)
∂t
= (˜r + µ˜(t))ppi(t) + φτyi(t) with ppi(0) = 0, (1)
2Samuelson (1958) shows that the internal rate of return of a transfer system is equal to the
growth rate of the contribution base of the system.
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where r˜ is the interest rate used by the pension system, µ˜(t) is the mortality haz-
ard rate at age t used by the pension system, and yi(t) is the labor income. The
total number of pension points in Eq. (1) receives a different name in each pension
system. For instance, in a DC system, the total number of pension points before
retirement is equal to the pension wealth, while in a DB system the total number of
pension points at retirement is equal to the average indexed yearly earnings.
To calculate the pension benefit of a retiree, bi(Ri), the government applies a
conversion factor, fi(Ri), that transforms at retirement the pension points accumu-
lated (pp) into pension benefits
bi(Ri) = fi(Ri)ppi(Ri). (2)
In a DC system, the government transforms the pension wealth into an annuity
using cohort-specific life tables and an effective interest rate. As a consequence,
a higher life expectancy at retirement, holding the effective interest rate constant,
leads to a reduction in benefits in a DC system. Thus, the conversion factor at the
age of retirement, Ri, is
fi(Ri) = Ei(Ri)/A˜(Ri, r˜), (3)
whereEi(Ri) is a factor that corrects for the difference in life expectancy of individ-
uals of type i ∈ I relative to the average individual at retirement. Similar to Ayuso
et al. (2017) we assume the correction factor is specific to the group to which the
individual belongs and depends on the retirement age Ri.3 A˜(Ri, r˜) is the present
value of a life annuity of a dollar per year, paid from age Ri onwards, calculated
with an effective interest of r˜ and a mortality hazard rate µ˜(·).
In the DB system, the government multiplies the average indexed yearly earn-
ings by a replacement rate, ϕ(pp), and then applies an adjustment factor β(Ri)
for early or late retirement to determine the pension benefit of the retiree. The re-
placement rate can be constant (i.e., ϕ(pp) = ϕ) or it can decrease as the average
indexed yearly earnings increases (i.e., ϕ′(pp) < 0). To consider actuarial fairness
we implement for the DB system the penalties/rewards for early/late retirement es-
tablished in the US pension system for each birth cohort. As a result, in a DB
system, the conversion factor at the age of retirement Ri is
fi(Ri) = Ei(Ri)β(Ri)ϕ(ppi(Ri)), (4)
where Ei(Ri) is the same correction factor introduced in Eq. (3). Thus, while the
DC system takes into account the life expectancy through A˜(Ri, r˜), there is no such
relationship in the DB system.
3We denote the actuarial present value at the exact age x, using the mortality hazard rates µi(·),
when the effective interest rate is r as Ai(x, r) =
∫ ω
x
e−
∫ t
x
r+µi(j)djdt. The correction factor pro-
posed by Ayuso et al. (2017) is Ei(Ri) = A˜(Ri, r˜)/Ai(Ri, r˜).
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3.2 Pension wealth
Given that individuals expect to receive future benefits during retirement out of their
contributions, the pension system generates a transfer wealth, which is known as the
social security wealth (SSW). SSW is defined as the present value of the survival
weighted stream of future benefits minus the present value of the survival weighted
stream of remaining social contributions. Hence, if we compare individuals with
similar stream of contributions, but different life expectancies, those individuals
with high life expectancy will have a higher SSW than individuals with low life
expectancy. As a consequence, individuals with high life expectancy will value their
contributions more than those with low life expectancy. To explicitly account for the
mortality differential effect on the value of contributing to the pension system, we
compare for each individual the value of investing, from age t < Ri until retirement,
a dollar in the pension system to the value of investing the same dollar in the capital
market
Pi(t) = φfi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r)e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj. (5)
The term φfi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r) is the present value of the weighted stream of benefits
from retirement until death that results from the contribution of a dollar. The expo-
nential term accounts for the difference from age t until retirement between the rate
of return of the pension system, r˜ + µ˜, and the rate of return of the capital market,
r + µi.
Using (5), we can rewrite the evolution of the social security wealth over the
working life as follows
∂SSWi(t)
∂t
=
(
r˜ + µ˜(t) +
1
Pi(t)
∂Pi(t)
∂t
)
SSWi(t) + τyi(t) (6)
with SSWi(ω) = 0. The derivation of (6) is provided in Appendix B. The term
1
Pi(t)
∂Pi(t)
∂t
is the evolution of the value of investing a dollar in the pension system
at age t < Ri to the value of investing the same dollar in the capital market, which
from (5) is equal to
1
Pi(t)
∂Pi(t)
∂t
= (r − r˜) + (µi(t)− µ˜(t)), (7)
and τyi(t) is the social contribution paid. When µ˜(t) = µi(t), we have that Pi
increases more rapidly with age when the market interest rate is higher than the
interest used by the social security system (i.e, r > r˜). When r = r˜ and the social
security system applies the same average mortality rate to all individuals, those
individuals with a life expectancy below the average level (i.e., ei(x0) < e˜(x0)
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or µi(t) > µ˜(t)∀t) will begin with a low valuation of their contributions but it
will increase with age, while those individuals with a life expectancy above the
average level (i.e., ei(x0) > e˜(x0) or µi(t) < µ˜(t)∀t) will begin with a higher
valuation of their contributions but it will decrease with age. See Figure 1 for an
illustration. Thus, the second component of (7) accounts for the redistribution of
resources within the cohort from those with low life expectancy to those with high
life expectancy.
Pi(t)
Age t
if µi(x) = µ˜(x)
x0 Ri
0
1
if µi(t) > µ˜(t)
if µi(t) < µ˜(t)actuarially fair
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Figure 1: Stylized evolution of the relative value of a dollar contributed to the pen-
sion system at age x for an individual who plans to retire at age Ri, Pi(t). Case:
when r˜ = r.
3.3 Basic components of alternative pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems
We implement the pension model introduced in sections 3.1 and 3.2 to analyze six
alternative PAYG pension systems (3 DCs and 3 DBs). To ease the comparison
across pension systems and clearly show their main features, we will for the mo-
ment introduce three assumptions that are convenient for understanding how the
six alternative pension systems affect eqs. (2)–(7) across individual types. First,
we assume the market interest rate coincides with the internal rate of return of a
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PAYG pension system (i.e., r = r˜ ≡ n+ g, so Eq. (7) depends on µi(t) and µ˜(t)).4
Second, the retirement age Ri is assumed to be the same across individual types
and coincides with the normal retirement age established by the pension system,
which we denote by Rn. In other words, we abstract from any penalty/reward for
early/late retirement (i.e., β(Rn) = 1).5 Third, all pension systems provide the
same replacement rate for the average individual within each cohort, which implies
that ϕ = (τ/%)/A˜(Rn, r˜). However, the first two assumptions will not hold in our
simulation results, which are based on actual data for the US.
The following pension systems are implemented:
1. A standard notional defined contribution system (NDC-I) in which the gov-
ernment applies the same average life table for all income groups for com-
puting the pension points and calculating the retirement benefits.
2. A notional defined contribution system (NDC-II) in which the government
computes the pension points using an average life table for all income groups.
However, unlike NDC-I, the government uses the income-specific life table
for the calculation of the retirement benefits. This pension system mimics the
one proposed by Ayuso et al. (2017).
3. A notional defined contribution system (NDC-III) in which the government
applies the income-specific life table associated to each individual type both
for the computation of the pension points and for the calculation of the retire-
ment benefits.
4. A defined benefit system that uses all the parametric components of the US
pension system, except for the replacement rate that is assumed to be constant
at 0,417 (DB-I).
5. A defined benefit system with a progressive replacement rate (see Fig. 2 in
Sa´nchez-Romero and Prskawetz, 2017). This pension system mimics the US
pension system (DB-II).
6. A defined benefit system with a two-tier replacement rate (DB-III). One tier
introduces a progressive replacement rate as in the US pension system, while
the second tier corrects for differences in life expectancy similar to the NDC-
II.
4Note that, for the sake of simplicity, here, we assume no difference between a funded and an
unfunded pension system. Later, in Section 6 we assume that r > r˜.
5The parametric component β(Rn) is in fact one of the ways that differential mortality affects
actuarial fairness of PAYG pension systems. In Section 6 we use the actual penalty/reward function
by birth cohort from the US pension system.
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Table 2: Alternative PAYG pension systems and their impact on the social security
wealth at age x0 by life expectancy
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION (DC)
Avg. Life Table (LT) Corrected Avg. LT i-th LT
Symbol NDC-I NDC-II NDC-III
Indexation r˜ n+ g n+ g n+ g
Point factor φ 1 1 1
Correction factor Ei 1 A˜(Rn, r˜)/Ai(Rn, r˜) 1
Replacement rate fi 1/A˜(Rn, r˜) Ei(Rn)/A˜(Rn, r˜) 1/Ai(Rn, r˜)
Value of $1 contributed Pi(x0)
{
< 1 for ei < e˜,
> 1 for ei > e˜.
{
< 1 for ei < e˜,
> 1 for ei > e˜.
1
Value of $1 contributed Pi(Rn)
{
< 1 for ei < e˜,
> 1 for ei > e˜.
1 1
Soc. sec. wealth SSWi(x0)
{
< 0 for ei < e˜,
> 0 for ei > e˜.
{
< 0 for ei < e˜,
> 0 for ei > e˜.
0
DEFINED BENEFIT (DB)
Non-Progressive Progressive Corrected-Progressive
Symbol DB-I DB-II DB-III
Indexation r˜ n+ g n+ g n+ g
Point factor φ %/τ %/τ %/τ
Correction factor Ei 1 1 A˜(Rn, r˜)/Ai(Rn, r˜)
Replacement rate fi β(Rn)ϕ β(Rn)ϕ(ppi(Rn)) Ei(Rn)β(Rn)ϕ(ppi(Rn))
Value of $1 contributed Pi(x0)
{
< 1 for ei < e˜,
> 1 for ei > e˜.
≶ 1 ≶ 1
Value of $1 contributed Pi(Rn)
{
< 1 for ei < e˜,
> 1 for ei > e˜.
≶ 1
{
> 1 for ei < e˜,
< 1 for ei > e˜.
Soc. sec. wealth SSWi(x0)
{
< 0 for ei < e˜,
> 0 for ei > e˜.
≶ 0 ≶ 0
Notes: ‘e˜’ denotes the life expectancy at birth of the reference population group used by the social security system, which
we assume is calculated using the average survival probability of the birth cohort. ‘ei’ denotes the life expectancy at birth
of the individual analyzed. x0 is the minimum working age. All the calculations are done under the following assumptions:
(a) the life expectancy is positively correlated with the income level, (b) the market interest rate r is equal to r˜ = n + g, (c)
the pension replacement rate ϕ is equal to (τ/%)/As(Rn, r˜) so as to coincide with the defined contribution system, and (d)
the retirement age is fixed at the normal retirement age for all population groups, which implies that β(Rn) = 1. Ai(Rn, r)
denotes the actuarial present value of an individual of type i at the exact age Rn when the effective interest rate is r.
Table 2 summarizes how each pension system may affect eqs. (2)–(7) across
individual types. Table 2 is divided in two sections. The top section contains the in-
formation for the defined contribution systems (from NDC-I to NDC-III), while the
section at the bottom provides the information for the defined benefit systems (from
DB-I to DB-III). For each pension system the information is divided in two groups
of individuals. Individuals with an average life expectancy below the average level
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(ei < e˜) and individuals with an average life expectancy above the average level
(ei > e˜). Table 2 shows that under the presence of a heterogeneous population by
life expectancy, those individuals who have a priori an average life expectancy be-
low (resp. above) the average level become (a) net contributors (resp. beneficiaries)
in a NDC-I, NDC-II, DB-I systems —i.e., SSWi(x0) < (>)0, they become (b) nei-
ther contributors nor beneficiaries in a NDC-III system —i.e. SSWi(x0) = 0, while
(c) the sign of the social security wealth is a priori ambiguous in a DB-II and a DB-
III systems. Nonetheless, if pension systems are highly progressive, then it should
be expected that those individuals with low (resp. high) income, who also have a
life expectancy below (resp. above) the average level, will become net beneficiaries
from (resp. contributors to) the pension system.
Table 2 can also be used for understanding the impact of each pension system on
the social security wealth after relaxing the first two assumptions. In particular, if
we first allow r > r˜, the overall value of a pension point will decline in all pension
systems and thus the social security wealth at age x0 will be lower. Second, if
individuals retire before (resp. after) Rn, the social security wealth value will be
smaller (resp. bigger) but the signs will remain.
4 The economic model
In the previous section we presented a general accounting framework for analyzing
most pension systems. Next, we explain the main features of the life cycle model
implemented to construct the labor income earned, the contributions paid, the total
pension points accumulated, and the pension benefits claimed by each individual
type i ∈ I across the six pension systems analyzed.
4.1 The individual problem
Let us consider an individual, who belongs to quintile i ∈ I, starts making decisions
after finishing the compulsory educational system at age x0, and lives up to a max-
imum age ω. Assume the stock of human capital accumulates at age t ∈ [x0, Si)
according to a Ben-Porath (1967) technology
∂hi(t)
∂t
= θihi(t)
γ − δhi(t) with hi(x0) = 1, (8)
where θi is the learning ability of an individual belonging to group i ∈ I, γ ∈ (0, 1)
is the returns to scale to the time devoted to education, and δ is the human capital
depreciation rate. From age Si onwards our individual earns a wage rate per hour
worked wi, which is assumed to be a function of years of schooling and years of
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post-schooling experience. Let the wage rate be wi(S, t) = hi(S)w¯(t − S), where
hi(S) is the stock of human capital of an individual with S years of schooling and
w¯(t− S) > 0 accounts for the returns to t− S years of post-schooling experience.
Assume the wage rate per hour worked increases with post-schooling experience
according to the following Mincer (1974) equation
w¯(t− S) = exp (β0(t− S)− β1(t− S)2) for t ≥ S, (9)
where β0, β1 > 0 are parameters that guarantee the usual hump-shape of the wage
rate per unit of human capital (see, for instance, Table 2, p. 326, in Heckman et al.,
2006).
During the working period the individual supplies her/his intensive labor in ex-
change for the wage rate wi(S, t) and pays contributions to the pension system.
Assume individuals relate their contributions to their future benefits, and so they
do not see them as a tax on labor income. This assumption connects the economic
model with the general pension model introduced in Section 3. Once the individual
reaches the retirement age, she/he receives the corresponding pension benefits and
enjoys leisure.
Budget constraint. The choice of the path of consumption ci, hours worked `i,
length of schooling Si, and the retirement age Ri are bounded by a lifetime budget
constraint.
We assume the existence of a perfect annuity market in which individuals can
purchase life-insured loans, when they are in debt, and annuities in case of having
positive financial wealth.6 Moreover, individuals start with zero assets, ai(x0) = 0,
and in the terminal age ω they do not hold wealth, ai(ω) = 0. Thus, the consump-
tion over the remaining lifespan is financed by current assets ai(x), by the present
value at age x of the remaining flow of labor income, and by the social security
wealth at age x, SSWi(x). The lifetime budget constraint at age x is∫ ω
x
e−
∫ t
x r+µi(j)djci(t)dt = ai(x) +
∫ Ri
x
e−
∫ t
x r+µi(j)djyi(Si, t)dt+SSWi(x), (10)
where r is the market interest rate, µi(t) is the mortality hazard rate at age t, and
yi(Si, t) = wi(Si, t)`i(t) is the (gross) labor income earned at age t by an individual
of type i after working `i(t) hours for a wage rate per hour worked of wi(Si, t).
6In case of death the insurance keeps the debt/assets. Therefore, individuals die without assets at
all ages.
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Preferences. The individual chooses the consumption path ci, the length of school-
ing Si, the number of hours worked `i for the wage ratewi, given by (8)–(9), and the
retirement age Ri by maximizing the lifetime expected utility Vi at age x ∈ [x0, S),
which is given by
Vi(x) =
∫ ω
x
e−
∫ t
x ρ+µi(j)djU (ci(t)) dt−
∫ Ri
Si
e−
∫ t
x ρ+µi(j)djαiv (`i(t)) dt
−
∫ Si
x
e−
∫ t
x ρ+µi(j)djηdt+
∫ ω
Ri
e−
∫ t
x ρ+µi(j)djϕ(t)dt. (11)
The first two components on the right-hand side of (11) are, respectively, the life-
time utility from consumption and the lifetime disutility from work. The third term
accounts for the disutility from attending school (Sa´nchez-Romero et al., 2016;
Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013; Oreopoulos, 2007) and the last term captures
the utility of leisure during retirement. ρ is the subjective discount factor, U(c)
is an instantaneous utility function that is assumed to be twice differentiable with
U ′(c) > 0 and U ′′(c) < 0, αi > 0 is the weight of the disutility of the labor supplied
for an individual of type i, v (`) is the disutility of working ` hours (with v′(`) > 0
and v′′(`) > 0), η > 0 is the marginal disutility from attending school and ϕ(t) > 0
(with ϕ′(t) ≥ 0) is the marginal utility of leisure during retirement, which increases
with age as the amount of retirement time is squeezed by later and later retirement.
The last three terms in (11) are key (i) for reproducing the supply of labor during
the working life, which is hump-shaped, (ii) for taking into account that the return
to schooling exceeds the marginal cost of education (Heckman et al., 2006), and
(iii) for replicating actual retirement ages given that individuals would never retire
because continuing to work would raise consumption and reduce intensive labor.
4.2 Optimal decisions
The primary objective of this section is to explain how each pension system affects
the economic behavior of our heterogenous individuals with respect to mortality.
We first solve the problem of maximizing lifetime utility (11) subject to the lifetime
budget constraint (10) and the laws of motion (1) and (6)–(9). The definition of the
Hamiltonians and the first-order conditions are reported in Appendix D.
We start by analyzing how each pension plan affects consumption and hours
worked for a given length of schooling and retirement age. Next, given the optimal
consumption and labor supply, we analyze the impact that each pension plan has on
the length of schooling and on the age of retirement.
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Consumption and hours worked. Given a length of schooling and retirement
age, the optimization yields the following optimal dynamics of consumption and
intensive labor supply (hours worked):
1
ci(t)
∂ci(t)
∂t
= σc(r − ρ), (12)
1
`i(t)
∂`i(t)
∂t
= σl
(
∂w(t−Si)
∂t
w(t− Si) − (r − ρ) +
τP i(t)
1− τ + τP i(t)
∂Pi(t)
∂t
P i(t)
)
, (13)
where σc = −U ′(c)/cU ′′(c) > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption and σ` = v′(`)/`v′′(`) > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for labor. Eq. (12) is the standard Euler equation for consumption and shows
that the rate of increase of consumption is not affected by the pension system. In
contrast, Eq. (13) shows that pension systems influence the evolution of the in-
tensive labor supply through P i. Indeed, P i measures the labor supply distortion
implied by the pension plan. The value of P i is calculated as the marginal rate of
substitution between social contributions and assets:7
P i(t) = ∂Vi(t)/∂ (ppi(t)/φ)
∂Vi(t)/∂ai(t)
= Pi(t) (1− εi) . (14)
P i(t) compares the value of an additional dollar invested in the pension system to
the value of investing the same additional dollar in the capital market. Hence, P i
differs from Pi because, as a result of paying an additional dollar to the pension
system, the pension replacement rate may fall
εi = −ppi(Ri)fi(Ri)
∂fi(Ri)
∂ppi(Ri)
≥ 0. (15)
We can distinguish two cases:8
(i) A flat pension system in which the replacement rate is invariant to the pension
points accumulated (εi = 0); i.e. P i = Pi. This is the case for pension
systems NDC-I, NDC-II, NDC-III, and DB-I.
(ii) A progressive pension system in which the replacement rate decreases with
the number of pension points accumulated (εi > 0); i.e. P i < Pi. This is the
case for pension systems DB-II and DB-III.
7A similar expression to (14) can be found in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Sa´nchez-
Romero and Prskawetz (2017).
8We exclude from our analysis any pension system that is a priori regressive; i.e, a pension
system that a priori transfers resources from the poor to the rich.
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From Eq. (13) it follows that an increase in P i over age will induce a postpone-
ment of labor supply to higher ages, whereas a decline in P i over age will induce
an anticipation of labor supply to earlier ages. From eqs. (7) and (14) we know that
an increase in P i(x) over age occurs when (r− r˜+µi(t)− µ˜(t)) > 0 and it declines
when (r− r˜+µi(t)− µ˜(t)) < 0. Therefore, pension systems incentivize individuals
with µi(t) < µ˜(t) to supply more labor early in the working life. Moreover, the
extent to which the labor supply varies with changes in P i(t) depend on its level.
Thus, flat pension systems have a stronger effect than progressive pension systems
on the path of labor supply.
Length of schooling. Given a retirement age Ri and the optimal paths of con-
sumption and labor supply, the optimal length of schooling S∗ satisfies:9
rhi (S
∗) = rwi (S
∗, Ri) +
η
U ′(ci(S∗))Wi(S∗, Ri)
. (16)
See the derivation of the optimal length of schooling condition in Appendix D.2.
The left-hand side of (16) is the return to education at the S∗th unit of schooling,
rhi (S
∗
i ) =
1
hi(S∗)
∂hi(S
∗)
∂S
. The first term on the right-hand side of (16), rwi (S
∗, Ri),
is the marginal cost of the S∗th unit of schooling expressed in terms of foregone
earnings. The last term in (16) is the marginal disutility from attending schooling,
η, relative to the utility given to the present value of the stream of labor earnings
out of effective social contributions, U ′(ci(S∗))Wi(S∗, Ri). The term
Wi(S
∗, Ri) =
∫ Ri
S∗
e−
∫ t
S∗ r+µi(j)dj(1− τi(t))yi(S∗, t)dt, (17)
and τi(t) = τ
(
1− P i(t)
)
is the effective social contribution rate.
Assuming a logarithmic utility function in consumption and given that con-
sumption, ci(S∗), depends on Pi —see eqs. (6) and (10)— while Wi(S∗, Ri) de-
pends on P i, from (16) we have that: (i) a flat pension system (i.e. Pi = P i)
does not change the optimal length of schooling because the non-pecuniary cost of
schooling remains constant. Thus, any change in schooling is driven by changes
in the retirement age. In contrast, (ii) a progressive pension system (i.e. Pi > P i)
reduces the optimal length of schooling, because this pension system increases the
non-pecuniary cost of schooling.
9See Sa´nchez-Romero et al. (2016) for a detailed explanation of the influence of the nonpecu-
niary cost of schooling on the optimal decision making process of the individual.
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Optimal retirement age. Consider now a fixed length of schooling Si. Under
this setting the optimal retirement age R∗ satisfies the following condition
U ′(ci(R∗))yi(Si, R∗)(1− τGWi (R∗)) = αiv (`i(R∗)) + ϕ(R∗). (18)
See the proof in Appendix D.3. Eq. (18) implies that individuals choose the re-
tirement age that equates the marginal benefit of continue working (left-hand side)
to the marginal cost of continue working (right-hand side). The right-hand side of
(18) is the sum of the disutility from work and the marginal utility loss of leisure
from not being retired. The term τGWi (R
∗) on the left-hand side of (18) is the ef-
fective tax/subsidy rate on additional work at older ages calculated by Gruber and
Wise (1999). This rate assesses the marginal change in the social security wealth
from delaying retirement, relative to the labor income the individual would have
earned. Given that in Section 3 we assumed that all DB systems implement the
same penalties/rewards for early/late retirement established in the US pension sys-
tem, all DB systems will have similar retirement incentives. Likewise, all NDC
systems will have similar incentives for early/late retirement based on the remain-
ing life expectancy at retirement.
5 Parametrization
We calibrate our model to match data for our reference group —i.e. US males born
in 1930— on the length of schooling, the retirement age, and the present value
of lifetime benefits at age 50 for each income quintile.10 Data on the length of
schooling and the retirement age for each income quintile is taken from the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS).11 The present value of lifetime benefits (PVB) at age
50 for the cohort born in 1930 is taken from the Report. Table 3 summarizes the
model economy parameters. We detail the assumptions and the strategy followed
in our calibration process in Appendix C.
Table 4 reports the optimal length of schooling Si and the optimal retirement
age Ri for the benchmark scenario (US males born in 1930, US pension system).
In Appendix E, tables 6 and 7 report the optimal length of schooling and retirement
10We calibrate our model to males born in the US because historical data on schooling, income,
labor force participations, and retirement for men is more abundant than for women. In addition, the
present value of expected benefits at age 50 for women is to a large extent affected by widowhood
benefits. Studying women will imply modeling the probability of becoming a widow, which is out
of the scope of this paper. See Haan et al. (2019) for an empirical estimation using administrative
data of the internal rate of return of men and women in Germany.
11Data from the HRS on length of schooling and retirement age for males born in 1930 was
provided by Arda Aktas and Miguel Poblete-Cazenave.
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Table 3: Model parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Parameter Symbol Value
Demographics Preferences
First age at entrance x0 14 Subjective discount factor ρ 0.005
Maximum age ω 114 Utility cost of not being retired ϕ(t) 483.65(e(t))−2.20
Annual population growth n 0.005 Labor elasticity of substitution σ` 0,33
Minimum length of schooling S 10 Utility weight of labor α(q1) 200
Maximum length of schooling S¯ 20 α(q2) 160
α(q3) 140
Technology α(q4) 130
Market interest rate r 0.030 α(q5) 130
Labor-augmenting technological progress
growth rate
g 0,015
Education
Social security system Returns of scale in education γ 0.65
Minimum retirement age R NDC=55, DB=62 Disutility of schooling η 3.5
Maximum retirement age R 70 Mincerian eq. β0 0.07
Capitalization factor r¯ 0.02 β1 0.0011
Accrual rate in DB systems φ 1/45 Learning ability θ(q1) 0.110
Avg. replacement rate in DB systems f(pp) 0.4167 θ(q2) 0.110
Social contribution rate θ(q3) 0.110
Cohort 1930 τ1930 0.1192 θ(q4) 0.115
Cohort 1960 τ1960 0.1460 θ(q5) 0.115
ages for all pension scenarios, respectively. Life expectancy and total years-worked
are calculated using the specific mortality rates for each income quintile. The last
column in Table 4 shows how, in our model, individuals in higher income quintiles
spend a longer period of time in retirement relative to the total number of years
worked.
Table 4: In-sample performance of the model: Optimal length of schooling (Si),
retirement age (Ri), and present value of lifetime benefits (PVB) by income quintile.
US males born in 1930, US pension system (DB-II)
Schooling Retirement PVB Life Years-worked Years-retired
at age 50 expectancy to
(in $1 000s) at Si + 6 years-worked
Si Ri ei(Si + 6) YWi
ei(Si+6)−YWi
YWi
Quintile Bench. Data Bench. Data Bench. Data Bench. Bench. Bench.
q1 11.30 11.20 62.70 63.18 132 126 54.31 41.91 0.30
q2 11.80 11.04 63.30 63.60 149 141 54.63 42.12 0.30
q3 12.30 12.28 64.00 63.56 170 166 55.33 42.49 0.30
q4 13.20 12.84 64.70 63.52 198 192 56.25 42.50 0.32
q5 14.20 14.55 65.20 64.23 225 226 58.03 42.76 0.36
Notes: Small figures highlighted in gray are data from the HRS on length of schooling and retirement age for males
born in 1930, and from the NASEM (2015) on the present value of lifetime benefits for the same cohort.
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6 Redistributive effects of each pension system
6.1 Internal rate of return
One measure to analyze the redistributive characteristics of a pension system, which
is not affected by the scale of contributions (i.e., ppi), is the internal rate of return
(IRR). Thus, we report in Figure 2 the IRR values of each pension system by income
quintile and birth cohort. The differences in IRR across income quintiles, shown in
Fig. 2, are explained by the fact that a pension point earned by an individual with
low life expectancy has a lower value than a pension point earned by an individual
with higher life expectancy (see Eq. (5) and Table 2).
In a stable, mature PAYG pension system, the implicit rate of return equals the
rate of growth of the population plus the rate of growth of productivity, or in this
case 2.0% per year. In Fig. 2 we see that this rate of return is achieved by all
income groups and mortality regimes under NDC-III —see black solid line— in
which both point accumulation and the annuity rate are adjusted for the mortality
of each group. This is the benchmark against which we can assess the rate of return
for the groups under the other pension systems. For the NDC-I and NDC-II cases,
we see that the lower income quintiles q1, q2 and q3 have IRR<2.0 —see the num-
bers in black at the bottom of each bar— and therefore are redistributing income to
the higher income q4 and q5 who have IRR>2.0, and this redistribution is greater
for the mortality regime of the 1960 birth cohort. The situation is more compli-
cated for the DB systems. The actual US system, corresponding quite closely to
DB-II, is explicitly designed to be redistributive from rich to poor through explicit
differences in the replacement rates by income. However, we see that because of
differential mortality, DB-II fails in this goal, and instead redistributes from q1 and
q2 to q4 and q5 under both mortality regimes, but particularly with more unequal
mortality in the 1960s. The q3 group does redistribute to others, at least slightly,
under the 1930 mortality regime and becomes a net receiver under the more un-
equal mortality. In other words, the differential mortality completely undoes and
mostly reverses the intended progressivity of the DB-II system (Sa´nchez-Romero
and Prskawetz, 2017). Under DB-III, which both has progressive benefit levels and
makes additional adjustments to benefits for differential mortality, there is a signif-
icant improvement, but the degree of progressivity is also weakened with the more
unequal mortality regime.
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(b) Mortality regime of 1960 cohort
Figure 2: Internal rate of return of each pension system by income quintile (in
percentage). US males, with mortality regime of birth cohorts 1930 (Panel a) and
1960 (Panel b)
Notes: Horizontal lines depict the internal rate of return of the NDC-III system. The numbers at the
bottom of each column report the internal rate of return for each income quintile group.
6.2 The value of investing an additional dollar in each pension
system
Another method to measure the redistributive effects of a pension system is to look
at the relative value of investing an additional dollar in the pension system com-
pared to the value of investing an additional dollar in the capital market; i.e P i.
Hence, as shown in sections 3.2 and 4.2, P i can be used to study at each age and
across individual types the redistributive effect of each pension system. Moreover,
P i complements the information provided in the previous section, since the IRR
measures the redistributive effects of each pension system over the whole life cy-
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cle, while P i does it by age.
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Figure 3: Relative value of investing an additional dollar in the pension system,
P i(x), from age 30 to 55 by income quintile relative to NDC-III. US males, with
mortality regime of birth cohorts 1930 (Panel a) and 1960 (Panel b)
To understand the redistributive properties by age, we compare the value of P i
for each pension system to our benchmark (NDC-III). We report in Figure 3 the
difference in the evolution of P i for each pension plan and that in the NDC-III by
income quintile and birth cohort. Vertical axes in Fig. 3 reflect whether the contribu-
tion to the system represents a subsidy from other income groups (positive values)
or transfer to other income groups (negative values) and whether the contribution
or subsidy changes with age. We see that NDC-I, NDC-II, and DB-I (pension plans
with a flat replacement rate) redistribute income from poor (q1, q2, and q3) to rich
income groups (q4 and q5). The situation is reversed in the progressive pension
systems DB-II and DB-III, in which we see that the higher income quintiles q4
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Table 5: Marginal and average replacement rates at the normal retirement age
Case Marginal replacement rate Replacement rate
fi(Rn,ppi(Rn))(1− εi) fi(Rn,ppi(Rn))
0.90 for ppi ≤ y¯/6,
0.32 for y¯/6 < ppi < y¯,
0.15 for y¯ < ppi ≤ 2y¯,
0.00 for 2y¯ < ppi,

0.90 for ppi ≤ y¯/6,
0.32 + 0.58
6
y¯
ppi
for y¯/6 < ppi < y¯,
0.15 + 1.60
6
y¯
ppi
for y¯ < ppi ≤ 2y¯,
3.40
6
y¯
ppi
for 2y¯ < ppi,
DB-II
DB-III
DB-I
0.417 0.417
NDC-I
NDC-II
NDC-III
Notes: The term y¯ denotes the average labor income of the economy.
and q5 have a lower value of P i than lower income quintiles q1 and q2 under the
mortality regime of the 1930 cohort. The fact that P i − PNDC−IIIi is negative
for all income quintiles, in DB-II and DB-III systems, is due to the fact that the
marginal replacement rate of DB-II and DB-III systems compared to the marginal
replacement rate of the NDC-III system —see first column in Table 5— is 23%(=1-
0.32/0.417) lower, for individuals with pension points between one-sixth and one
average labor income, and 64%(=1-0.15/0.417) lower, for individuals with pension
points between one and two times the average labor income. Comparing the results
between the two mortality regimes (cf. panels (a) and (b)), we see further redistri-
bution of income from poor individuals to rich individuals under NDC-I, NDC-II
and DB-I plans and similar implicit taxes between poor and rich individuals in the
more unequal mortality regime.
6.3 Wealth
The fact that pension systems redistribute income across income groups leads indi-
viduals to respond in order to cope with the increase/loss of wealth. The lifetime
wealth measure (LW) gives the most comprehensive assessment of the effects of the
different pension designs on economic wellbeing, because it includes the general
behavioral responses. These responses are reflected in the LW —see Eq. (10)—
through changes in the social security wealth at age x0, SSW(x0), and through
changes in the stock of human capital (HK) at age x0 valued as the present value of
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expected lifetime earnings
HKi(x0) =
∫ Ri
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djyi(Si, t)dt. (19)
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Figure 4: Effects of each pension system and mortality regime on human capital
and Social Security wealth by income quintile (measured in percentage change with
respect to the results in the NDC-III system). US males, mortality regimes of birth
cohorts 1930 (Panel a) and 1960 (Panel b).
Notes: Bars are plotted in ‘stacked’ format. When bars have opposite signs, lifetime wealth is the
difference between both bars. When bars have similar signs, lifetime wealth equals the height of the
two bars.
To analyze the changes in LW across pension systems by income quintiles, we
again use the NDC-III system as a benchmark against which we can assess these
changes —see Table 10 in Appendix E. Figure 4 shows the percentage change in
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SSW (red bars) and HK (blue bars) by income quintile between the alternative pen-
sion systems and the NDC-III system. The negative values of the SSW for lower
quintiles as opposed to positive, or rather negligible, values of SSW for higher in-
come quintiles shows the redistribution of income from low to high income groups
across all pension systems (see Fig. 4). At the same time, behavioral reactions in-
duce changes in the length of schooling and retirement, which modify the stock of
human capital (HK) (see tables 6–7 in Appendix E).12 Looking at each pension plan,
we can see that the DB-I system leads to an increase in HK for all income quintiles
under the mortality regime of the 1930 cohort. Under the mortality regime of the
cohort born in 1960, the DB-I system benefits mostly the higher income quintiles
due to the decrease in SSW for low income quintiles. In all cases the increase is
driven by the postponement in the retirement age, the additional years of schooling,
and by the higher wage rate due to further investments in human capital compared
to the NDC-III system. Instead, the actual US pension system —i.e., DB-II— re-
duces HK of q4–q5 under the mortality regime of the cohort born in 1930 due to the
significant drop in the relative value of investing an additional dollar in the pension
system for these two income groups (see Fig. 3). Under the mortality regime of the
cohort born in 1960 the overall effect of the DB-II plan on HK is negative. This
is because individuals respond to the decline in the relative value of investing an
additional dollar in the pension system and in the returns to education by reducing
the length of schooling.
The impact of the DB-III system on HK is similar to that in DB-II but now the
progressivity of the pension system is re-introduced. It is striking that in DB plans
the indirect effects on HK arising from incentives for school, work, and retirement,
usually are far larger than in NDC plans. This is because DB plans, with the retire-
ment incentives designed in the US pension system, produce an incentive to retire
at later ages, which does not necessarily coincide with incentives of the NDC plans.
As a consequence, the increase in the retirement age leads to an increase in the
length of schooling in the DB-I plan. However, in DB-II and DB-III plans, the de-
crease in the value of investing an additional dollar in the pension system reduces
the returns of education, leading to a lower length of schooling relative to that in
the NDC-III plan.
Under the NDC-I and NDC-II plans, lower income quintiles q1–q3 experience
a reduction in LW, whereas the LW of higher income quintiles increases. Under
both mortality regimes, the difference in LW under the NDC-I and NDC-II across
income quintiles is explained by the change in SSW compared to the NDC-III plan.
12Following the suggestion of anonymous reviewers, we provide in figs. 6–7 in Appendix E an
alternative calculation of the changes in human capital by comparing the lifetime wealth calculation
with and without behavioral reactions in which we keep the schooling, the labor supply and the
retirement calibrated for the DB-II system.
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6.4 Welfare
We have shown in the previous section that differences in lifetime wealth come
with changes in schooling and leisure time, through age at retirement. Given that
our lifetime utility (see Eq. 11) includes disutility of schooling, labor, and the utility
from retirement, we can assess the impact of the different pension plans on lifetime
welfare by income quintile. We will not attempt to assess how well the pension sys-
tem solves the underlying problem that some people cannot provide for their own
retirement. Instead, we see how lifetime utility under each pension program would
differ from lifetime utility under the neutral NDC-III program structure (NDC with
separate life tables) for each income quintile. These differences are shown in Fig-
ure 5.
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(b) Mortality regime of 1960 cohort
Figure 5: Impact of each pension system on welfare by income quintile (relative to
the NDC-III system). US males, with mortality regime of birth cohorts 1930 (Panel
a) and 1960 (Panel b).
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In Figure 5 we show the impact on lifetime welfare of each pension system by
income quintile relative to the NDC-III plan. By comparing outcomes to those for
the NDC-III system for each income quintile, we isolate the impact on welfare of
each pension plan relative to a non redistributive pension system. The first impor-
tant result can be seen by comparing in Fig. 5 the differences between the NDC
plans and DB plans. Recall that all DB plans are implemented with the penal-
ties/rewards for early/late retirement established in the US pension system, which
give individuals an incentive to retire at a later age than NDC plans. In our particu-
lar case, under the mortality regime of the 1930 cohort, individuals retire between
ages 61 and 66 in NDC plans, whereas individuals retire at older ages under the DB
systems —see Table 7 in Appendix E. This difference in the retirement age between
NDC and DB plans accounts for the strong behavioral response, its impact on the
stock of human capital (see Fig. 4), and the welfare loss through the heavy cost in
leisure.
In NDC plans we do not observe significant differences in the length of school-
ing. Thus, the sign of the change in welfare across income quintiles is explained by
the impact of the pension system on SSW and hence on consumption. Moreover,
given that the NDC-II is closer than the NDC-I to the NDC-III, the NDC-II plan
creates smaller welfare differences across income quintiles than the NDC-I.
Comparing the results across DB plans is slightly more complicated. First,
we know that the DB-I plan gives individuals higher incentives to retire later —
increasing their marginal benefit of education— and to stay longer in schooling.
This explains the increase in the stock of human capital (see Fig. 4) under the mor-
tality regime of the 1930 cohort.However, the increase in human capital comes at
the expense of facing a higher disutility from schooling and a loss in leisure. Only
those in the highest income quintile are better off due to the strong redistribution of
resources from short-lived and poor individuals to long-lived and rich individuals
(see Fig. 2). Unlike the DB-I plan, the US pension system (DB-II plan) introduces
a high implicit tax on work to all income quintiles. As a consequence, individuals
retire in the DB-II earlier than in DB-I, though still later than in the NDC plans
due to the penalties on early retirement. Moreover, given that the DB-II system
produces a high implicit tax on labor, decreasing the marginal benefit of education,
the length of schooling is shortened. The combination of these three behavioral
reactions explains the reduction in human capital (see Fig. 4) and the increase in
welfare to all income quintiles relative to DB-I, except for q5 that now transfers
resources to short-lived and poor individuals. DB-III corrects for differences in life
expectancy, leaving the short-lived and poor individuals better off, compared to the
DB-II, and worsens the situation for long-lived and rich individuals.
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7 Conclusion
Public pension systems are intended to provide a stable source of post retirement
income, given that individuals have well-known difficulties saving for retirement.
Some pension systems are also designed to redistribute income from individuals
with higher lifetime incomes to those with lower. Almost all public pension systems
are PAYG, delivering an average rate of return to participants equal to the rate of
growth of the economy, which is typically lower than the market rate of interest,
and consequently participants may view their contributions at least partially as a
tax on labor. Pension systems modify labor supply incentives in two important
ways. First, the perceived tax on labor may lead participants to work less than
otherwise. Second, in DB systems the benefit structure has often created incentives
for early retirement, and built in progressivity may provide further disincentives
for labor. NDC systems were developed to avoid the early retirement incentive
effects by mimicking funded DC programs, but they cannot avoid the “tax on labor”
disincentive so long as they are PAYG.
It is increasingly realized that socioeconomic differences in longevity add a re-
gressive element on the benefit side of pensions, so long as systems use a one-size-
fits-all life table to establish actuarial tradeoffs and set the benefit rate and normal
retirement age. Researchers and policy makers are seeking policy options to offset
this regressive effect. However, it is important to keep in mind that policy adjust-
ments will have both direct and indirect effects on systems and their progressivity
through the behavioral responses of socioeconomic groups, effects which can be
evaluated using actuarial calculations. The policy adjustments will also alter the
decisions and behavior of individuals in different socioeconomic groups, because
incentives for getting education, for hours of work, and for retirement age, will all
be affected.
Here we have assessed the direct and indirect effects of a variety of policy ad-
justments to DB and NDC pension programs, which are assumed to have existed
over the long term, operating in environments of more or less mortality hetero-
geneity (reflecting the mortality regimes of the 1930 vs 1960 birth cohorts). We
have not yet attempted to investigate transitions from one program to another, al-
though that is the situation that policy makers must face. Our analysis is based on
an OLG model for a small open economy in which wages and interest rates are set
by international markets, while individuals make optimizing choices for education,
labor effort, age at retirement, and consumption trajectories. We have a number of
important findings.
1. We replicate, in our simulations, the regressive effect of socioeconomic dif-
ferences in mortality, and the large increase in regressivity moving from the
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mortality regimes of the 1930 and 1960 birth cohorts, for single life table
systems, whether DB or NDC.
2. Taking an actuarial approach (not general equilibrium) we find that the pro-
gressivity in benefits built into the US Social Security system greatly re-
duces the regressivity that mortality variation imparts, under either mortality
regime. However, only when each group has its own appropriate life table
is that regressivity overcome, resulting in a slightly progressive system as
measured by the IRR (internal rate of return). Apparently achieving progres-
sivity in lifetime benefits would require more than the current progressivity
in annual benefits in combination with life tables for each group.
3. If we also take into account the behavioral responses to policy adjustments,
these have sizable indirect effects. One way to assess these is through their
impact on lifetime wealth. Under all NDC versions, the indirect effects of
policy adjustments on wealth are relatively small and regressive. For the DB
systems, the indirect effects are stronger. The indirect effects can be positive
with non-progressive pension plans when the difference in life expectancy
across income quintiles is small. However, this same system induces highly
regressive effects under an environment with more mortality heterogeneity.
The indirect effects of adding progressive benefits are strongly negative at
higher incomes, and these change but little when group-specific life tables are
added. In general these indirect effects are quite similar in the two mortality
regimes in combination with life tables for each group.
4. But variations in lifetime wealth may mask offsetting variations in leisure,
and the most complete assessment of policy effects emerges from compar-
isons of lifetime utility across pension programs. Relative to the neutral
NDC-III lifetime utility, we find welfare losses for lower incomes and small
welfare gains for higher incomes. This pattern arises from the utility cost of
harder and longer work, which comes at a heavy cost in leisure. A reduction
in welfare losses for the lower incomes and welfare gains for richer incomes
can be achieved through the progressivity of benefits. However, only when
benefits are adjusted using different life tables for each group do we observe
slight welfare gains for the lower income groups relative to NDC-III.
5. Pension systems that introduce separate life tables for each group achieve the
best welfare outcomes for the bottom three quintiles, in both NDC systems
and DB systems. This finding suggests that policy makers should seriously
consider pension policies of this sort.
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Besides the above mentioned findings, in this paper we also propose a general pen-
sion framework for simultaneously analyzing existing pension systems. In this gen-
eral framework we exploit the relative value of investing an additional dollar in the
pension system, which can be used for studying the redistributive properties of each
pension system as well as the behavioral response on education, hours worked, re-
tirement, and consumption caused by each pension system. This general pension
framework can be used for addressing some currently debated pension reforms that
hinge on life expectancy heterogeneity (Breyer et al., 2010; NASEM, 2015). For
instance, we show that pension plans in which benefits are based on different life
tables (Ayuso et al., 2016, 2017; OECD, 2017; Holzmann et al., 2020) still provide
a higher return to individuals with higher lifetime income than to those with lower.
Thus, to restore an equal treatment of the pension system to all income groups re-
quires additional measures.
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Appendix: Redistributive effects of different pension
systems when longevity varies by socioeconomic sta-
tus
by Miguel Sanchez-Romero, Ronald D. Lee, Alexia Prskawetz
A Demographics
Individuals. Let the probability of surviving from birth to age x of an individ-
ual belonging to income group i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I} be
pi(x) = e
− ∫ x0 µi(t)dt, (A.1)
with pi(0) = 1, pi(ω) = 0, ω ∈ (0,∞) denotes the maximum age, and µi(t) ≥ 0
is the mortality hazard rate at age t of an individual of group i. The life expectancy
at age x of an individual belonging to income group i is defined as
ei(x) =
∫ ω
x
pi(t)
pi(x)
dt. (A.2)
Population. Given that all income groups grow steadily at the same rate n, the
total population size at time t is
P (t) = B(t)
∫ ω
0
e−nxp(x)dx, with p(x) =
1
I
∑
i∈I
pi(x), (A.3)
where B(t) is the total number of births at time t, p(x) is the average survival,
which implies that the average mortality hazard rate at age x, denoted by µ(x),
is
∑
i∈I µi(x)pi(x)
/∑
i∈I pi(x) . The existence of a positive relationship between
the income group and the life expectancy —see Table 1— implies that the aver-
age mortality hazard rate is biased with age towards the mortality hazard rate of
higher income individuals.
B Derivation of Eq. (6)
Assuming that an individual will retire at age Ri, we define the social security
wealth at age Si < t ≤ Ri of an individual of type i, denoted by SSWi(t), as
SSWi(t) = bi(Ri)
∫ ω
Ri
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djdx−
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτyi(x)dx. (B.1)
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The first component of (B.1) is the present value at age t of the survival weighted
stream of future benefits during retirement, while the second component of (B.1)
is the present value at age t of the survival weighted remaining pension contribu-
tions to pay until retirement.
Eq. (6) can easily be derived from (1)–(4) by elementary algebraic manipulations
of (B.1). Integrating Eq. (1) from Si until retirement Ri gives
ppi(Ri) =
∫ Ri
Si
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx. (B.2)
Splitting in two the integral (B.2) gives
ppi(Ri) =
∫ t
Si
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx+
∫ Ri
t
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx =
= e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)dj
∫ t
Si
e
∫ t
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx+
∫ Ri
t
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx.
(B.3)
Substituting (2) in (B.1), using the definition of Ai(Ri, r), and rearranging terms,
gives
SSWi(t) = e−
∫Ri
t r+µi(j)djfi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r)ppi(Ri)−
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτyi(x)dx.
(B.4)
By substituting (B.3) in (B.4) and after some manipulations we have
SSWi(t) = fi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r)e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj
∫ t
Si
e
∫ t
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx
+ e−
∫Ri
t r+µi(j)djφfi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r)
∫ Ri
t
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djφτyi(x)dx
−
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτyi(x)dx. (B.5)
By multiplying and dividing by φ the first term on the right-hand side of (B.5)
we obtain that the first term of (B.5) is Pi(t) times the total value of all the
contributions paid until age t, ppi(t)/φ. Moreover, we know from (5) that
Pi(t)e−
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)dj = φfi(Ri)Ai(Ri, r)e−
∫Ri
t r+µi(j)dj . Thus,
SSWi(t) = Pi(t)
ppi(t)
φ
+ Pi(t)e−
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)dj
∫ Ri
t
e
∫Ri
x r˜+µ˜(j)djτyi(x)dx
−
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτyi(x)dx. (B.6)
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Taking into account that Pi(t)Pi(x) = e
∫ x
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj , the social security wealth
at time t in (B.6) can also be written as
SSWi(t) = Pi(t)
ppi(t)
φ
−
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(x))yi(x)dx. (B.7)
The first component of (B.7) is the monetary value given to the stream of con-
tributions until age t, while the second component of (B.7) is the present value,
survival weighted, at age t of the stream of future implicit taxes/subsidies on
labor income.
By differentiating (B.7) with respect to t we have
∂SSWi(t)
∂t
=
(
r˜ + µ˜(t) +
1
Pi(t)
∂Pi(t)
∂t
)
Pi(t)
ppi(t)
φ
− (r + µi(t))
∫ Ri
t
e−
∫ x
t r+µi(j)djτ(1− P(x))yi(x)dx+ τyi(t).
(B.8)
Finally, using (7) in the second term of (B.8) and the definition of SSW in (B.7)
we obtain Eq. (6).
C Parametrization
We impose the following set of assumptions with respect to the economic vari-
ables. First, we assume a risk-free market discount factor (r) of 3%. This market
interest rate coincides with that assumed in the report by the National Academies
of Science (NASEM, 2015), that we use to parametrize this model. Second, the
population is assumed to grow at an annual constant rate (n) of 0.5% and the
growth rate of labor productivity (g) is set at 1.5% per year, corresponding closely
to the US case. Third, the annual capitalization factor of the unfunded pension
system (˜r) is set at 2%(=n + g), which is lower than the market discount factor.
Therefore, since a return of 1%(=3%-2%) is lost annually, contributions to the
pension system are implicitly considered by individuals as a tax on labor income.
From (7) we know that this assumption implies that the marginal value of a dollar
contributed to the pension system is an increasing function with respect to age
and, as a consequence, all pension systems will provide an incentive to supply
more labor early in the working life and to reduce labor before retirement. More-
over, since all pension systems have a similar increase inP i, pension systems will
have a similar direct impact on the length of schooling. Fourth, unless otherwise
indicated, we assume that the social security system uses the average survival
probability to calculate the pension benefits; i.e, p˜(x) := p(x) =
∑
i∈I pi(x)/I .
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Fifth, we assume for the NDC systems a minimum retirement age of 55 and a
maximum retirement age of 70 for all i ∈ I. For the DB systems, we restrict the
minimum retirement age to 62 and the maximum to 70, similar to the US pension
system. Sixth, the social security budget is balanced13∑
i∈I
∫ Ri
Si
e−ntpi(t)τwi(Si, t)`i(t)dt =
∑
i∈I
e−nRi
∫ ω
Ri
e−(n+g)(t−Ri)pi(t)bi(Ri)dt.
(C.1)
Using Eq. (C.1) we adjust in the DB systems the social contribution rate in order
to support all pension benefits claimed by the surviving retirees, while in the
NDC systems we adjust the overall pension replacement rate, or generosity of
the pension system. For the sake of comparison across the alternative pension
systems, we use for all the NDC systems the social contribution rate obtained for
the US pension system (DB-II). In particular, we obtain that the necessary social
contribution rate to balance the US pension system with our assumed population
structure is 11.92%, under the hypothetical assumption that the population faces
the survival probabilities of the cohort born in 1930. While τ must be set at
14.60% in the case of using the survival probabilities of the cohort born in 1960.
In addition, we assume all individuals have similar preferences, except for the
disutility of labor (αi) that is specific to the income quintile of the individual.
This assumption reflects the fact that individuals in different quintiles have differ-
ent health and labor market trajectories. The instantaneous utility of consumption
is assumed to be logarithmic (σc = 1), as found empirically by Chetty (2006),
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on labor (σ`) is set at 0.33, so that
workers supply on average thirty five percent of their available time for labor
(excluding sleep time), and the subjective discount factor (ρ) is set at 0.005. As
a result, the cross-sectional consumption profile increases with age by one per-
cent, similar to the consumption pattern reported in the NTA accounts for the US
in 2003 (see www.ntaccounts.org). The marginal utility of leisure during
retirement ϕ(·) is assumed to be constant across income groups and birth cohorts
and monotonically increasing with age. Thus, we consider the marginal utility of
leisure to be a function of the average life expectancy of the 1930 birth cohort;
i.e ϕ(t) = ϕ0 (e(t))
−ϕ1 with ϕ0, ϕ1 > 0. To match the wage rate per unit of hu-
man capital for the cohort born in 1930, we take the parameters of the Mincerian
equation reported in Table 2 in Heckman et al. (2006). Nevertheless, the param-
eter β0 is adjusted in order to take into account the effect of productivity growth.
As in Cervellati and Sunde (2013) we fix the returns to scale in education (γ) at
0.65. Following Sa´nchez-Romero et al. (2016) we set the disutility of schooling
13Note in Eq. (C.1) that similar to the US pension system, we assume that pension benefits are
held constant (in real terms) after retirement and thus they do not increase with productivity.
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(η) at 3.5 for all income groups, which corresponds to the most likely value of
η for an average return to schooling between 11 and 12 percent given the life
expectancy of US males born in 1930. The learning ability (θi) for each income
quintile group is calibrated to replicate the length of schooling and the retirement
age from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).14 Finally, the weight of dis-
ability cost (αi) is used to replicate the present value of lifetime benefits (PVB)
at age 50 reported in NASEM (2015) for the cohort born in 1930. See Table 9 in
Appendix E.
D Economic problem
We solve the problem of maximizing the lifetime utility (11) subject to the con-
straints (1)–(10) using the Hamiltonian before age Si, during the working period
(Si, Ri), and after the retirement age Ri, or periods 1, 2, and 3, respectively
(Tomiyama, 1985). We denote with the letter Hj the Hamiltonian associated to
period j = {1, 2, 3}.
Period 1. Given a length of schooling Si and retirement age Ri, the Hamilto-
nian of an individual type i ∈ I before working (t ≤ Si) is defined as
H1 = e−
∫ t
x0
ρ+µi(j)dj [U(ci(t))− η] + λ1a(t) [(r + µi(t))ai(t)− ci(t)] +
+ λh[θihi(t)
γ − δhi(t)] (D.1)
where λ1a(t) and λh(t) are the costate or adjoint variables associated to the dy-
namics of each state variable {ai(t), hi(t)} for period 1. The first-order conditions
(FOCs) for an interior consumption is:
∂H1
∂ci
= e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′(ci(t))− λ1a(t) = 0. (D.2)
The dynamic laws of the costate or adjoint variables are:
∂λ1a(t)
∂t
= −λ11(t)(r + µi(t)), (D.3)
∂λ1h(t)
∂t
= −λ1h(t)(γθihi(t)γ−1 − δ), (D.4)
14Data from the HRS on length of schooling and retirement age for males born in 1930 was
provided by Arda Aktas and Miguel Poblete-Cazenave.
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Period 2. Given a length of schooling Si and a retirement age Ri, the Hamil-
tonian of an individual type i ∈ I during the working period (Si < t < Ri) is
defined as
H2 = e−
∫ t
x0
ρ+µi(j)dj [U(ci(t))− αiv(`i(t))] +
+ λ2a(t) [(r + µi(t))ai(t) + (1− τ)hi(Si)w¯(t− Si)`i(t)− ci(t)] +
+ λ2p(t) [(˜r + µ˜(t))ppi(t) + φτhi(Si)w¯(t− Si)`i(t)] , (D.5)
where λ2a(t), λ
2
h(t), and λ
2
p(t) are the costate or adjoint variables associated to
the dynamics of each state variable {ai(t), hi(Si),ppi(t)} for period 2. The first-
order conditions (FOCs) for an interior consumption and hours worked are:
∂H2
∂ci
= e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′(ci(t))− λ2a(t) = 0, (D.6)
∂H2
∂`i
= −e−
∫ t
x0
ρ+µi(j)djαiv
′(`i(t)) + λ2a(t)(1− τ)hi(Si)w¯(t− Si)+
+ λ2p(t)φτhi(Si)w¯(t− Si) = 0. (D.7)
The dynamic laws of the costate or adjoint variables are:
∂λ2a(t)
∂t
= −λ2a(t)(r + µi(t)), (D.8)
∂λ2h(t)
∂t
= −λ2a(t)(1− τ)w¯(t− Si)`i(t)− λ2p(t)φτw¯(t− Si)`i(t), (D.9)
∂λ2p(t)
∂t
= −λ2p(t)(˜r + µ˜(t)). (D.10)
Period 3. Given a length of schooling Si and a retirement age Ri, the Hamilto-
nian of an individual type i ∈ I during retirement (t ≥ Ri) is defined as
H3 = e−
∫ t
x0
ρ+µi(j)dj [U(ci(t)) + ϕ(t)]
+ λ3a(t) [(r + µi(t))ai(t) + fi(Ri)ppi(Ri)− ci(t)] , (D.11)
where λ3a(t) and λ
3
p(t) are the costate or adjoint variables associated to the dynam-
ics of the state variables {ai(t),ppi(t)} for period 3. The first-order conditions
(FOCs) for an interior consumption and hours worked are:
∂H3
∂ci
= e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′(ci(t))− λ2a(t) = 0. (D.12)
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Using the definition (15), the dynamic laws of the costate or adjoint variables are:
∂λ3a(t)
∂t
= −λ3a(t)(r + µi(t)), (D.13)
∂λ3p(t)
∂t
= −λ3a(t)fi(Ri)(1− εi). (D.14)
Moreover, the following matching conditions hold at the switching ages Si and
Ri for the costate or adjoint variables
λa(Si) := λ
1
a(Si) = λ
2
a(Si), (D.15a)
λh(Si) := λ
1
h(Si) = λ
2
h(Si), (D.15b)
λa(Ri) := λ
2
a(Ri) = λ
3
a(Ri), (D.15c)
λp(Ri) := λ
2
p(Ri) = λ
3
p(Ri), (D.15d)
and for the Hamiltonians
H(Si) := H1(Si) = H2(Si), (D.16a)
H(Ri) := H2(Ri) = H3(Ri). (D.16b)
Taking into account the above matching conditions, let us define the marginal rate
of substitution of assets for social contributions P(t) = φλp(t)/λa(t) for periods
{2, 3}. Differentiating P(t) with respect to time t, and using the dynamics of the
adjoint variables, gives
∂P(t)
∂t
=
{
P(t)(r − r˜ + µi(t)− µ˜(t)) for Si < t < Ri,
P(t)(r + µi(t))− φfi(Ri)(1− εi) for t ≥ Ri.
(D.17)
Solving (D.17) and using the fact that P(ω) = 0, the marginal rate of substitution
of assets for a dollar of social contribution is:
P(t) = φfi(Ri)(1− εi)Ai(Ri, r)e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj, (D.18)
which is equivalent to P(t) = P(t)(1− εi).
D.1 Optimal paths of consumption (c) and hours worked (`)
From the FOCs, the optimal consumption and hours worked at age x satisfy
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′(ci(t)) = λa(t), (D.19)
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djαiv′(`i(t)) = λa(t)hi(Si)w¯(t− Si)(1− τ + τP(t)). (D.20)
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Taking logarithms in both sides of the equation and differentiating with respect
to t gives
−(ρ+ µi(t)) + ci(t)U
′′(ci(t))
U ′(ci(t))
1
ci(t)
∂ci(t)
∂t
=
1
λa(t)
∂λa(t)
∂t
, (D.21)
−(ρ+ µi(t)) + `i(t)v
′′(`i(t))
v′(`i(t))
1
`i(t)
∂`i(t)
∂t
=
1
λa(t)
∂λa(t)
∂t
+
w¯′(t− Si)
w¯(t− Si) +
τP ′(t)
1− τ + τP(t) .
(D.22)
Using the envelope condition on assets held and rearranging terms, we obtain
(12) and (13), respectively.
D.2 Optimal length of schooling (Si)
Given an optimal retirement age Ri we first differentiate the expected utility
Vi(x0) w.r.t. S and making it equal to zero∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′ (ci(t)) ∂ci(t)
∂S
dt−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djαiv′ (`i(t)) ∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
= e
− ∫ Sx0 ρ+µi(j)dj (η − αiv(`i(S))) . (D.23)
Substituting the FOCs in the previous equation gives∫ ω
x0
λa(t)
∂ci(t)
∂S
dt−
∫ Ri
S
λa(t)(1− τ + τP(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
= e
− ∫ Sx0 ρ+µi(j)dj (η − αiv(`i(S))) . (D.24)
Solving the envelope condition on assets gives λa(t) = λa(x0)e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj .
Substituting this last result in (D.24) and dividing by λa(x0) gives∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂S
dt−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
= e
− ∫ Sx0 ρ+µi(j)dj η − αiv(`(S))
λa(x0)
. (D.25)
Second, we differentiate the budget constraint (10) at age x0 w.r.t. S∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂S
dt =
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djwi(S, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
+
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
− e−
∫ S
x0
r+µi(j)djwi(S, S)`i(S) +
∂SSWi(x0)
∂S
. (D.26)
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From (B.7) we have
SSWi(x0) = −
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt. (D.27)
First, differentiating (D.27) with respect to S gives
∂SSWi(x0)
∂S
= −
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P(t))wi(S, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P(t))∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
+ e
− ∫ Sx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P(S))wi(S, S)`i(S)
+
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ ∂P(t)
∂S
wi(S, t)`i(t)dt. (D.28)
Second, differentiating (5) with respect to S gives
∂Pi(t)
∂S
= φ
∂fi(Ri)
∂ppi(Ri)
∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
Ai(Ri, r)e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj. (D.29)
Using (5) and (15) in (D.29) gives
∂Pi(t)
∂S
= − 1
ppi(Ri)
∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
εiPi(t). (D.30)
Substituting (D.30) on the third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (D.28), and
using the fact that Pi(t) = Pi(Ri)e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜i(j)−(r+µi(j))dj gives, after canceling
terms,
∂Pi(t)
∂S
= −∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
εiPi(Ri)
φ
e
− ∫Rix0 r+µi(j)dj. (D.31)
Differentiating the total pension points at age Ri with respect to S gives
∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
=
∫ Ri
S
e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)djφτwi(S, t)
∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
+
∫ Ri
S
e
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)djφτ
∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
− e
∫Ri
S r˜+µ˜(j)djφτwi(S, S)`i(S). (D.32)
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Plugging (D.32) in (D.31), and using the fact that Pi(Ri) =
Pi(t)e−
∫Ri
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj , gives
∂Pi(t)
∂S
= −∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
Pi(Ri)
φ
εie
− ∫Rix0 r+µi(j)dj
= −
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτεiPi(t)wi(S, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτεiPi(t)∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
+ e
− ∫ Sx0 r+µi(j)djτεiPi(S)wi(S, S)`i(S). (D.33)
Substituting (D.33) in the last term in (D.28) gives
∂SSWi(x0)
∂S
= −
∫ Ri
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P i(t))wi(S, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
−
∫ Ri
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P i(t))∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
+ e
− ∫ Sx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− P i(S))wi(S, S)`i(S). (D.34)
By plugging (D.34) into (D.26) we have∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂S
dt−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1−τ+τP i(t))wi(S, t)∂`i(t)
∂S
dt
=
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
− e−
∫ S
x0
r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, S)`i(S).
Using the fact that the left-hand side of (D.25) and (D.31) are equal, then
e
− ∫ Sx0 ρ+µi(j)dj η − αiv(`i(S))
λa(x0)
=
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))∂wi(S, t)
∂S
`i(t)dt
− e−
∫ S
x0
r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, S)`i(S). (D.35)
Now, differentiating wi(S, t) w.r.t. S gives
∂wi(S, t)
∂S
=
∂w¯(t− S)
∂S
hi(S) + w¯(t− S)∂hi(S)
∂S
= − 1
w¯(t− S)
∂w¯(t− S)
∂t
wi(S, t) +
1
hi(S)
∂hi(S)
∂S
wi(t, S). (D.36)
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Third, we use (D.36) in (D.35)
e
− ∫ Sx0 ρ+µi(j)dj η − αiv(`i(S))
λa(x0)
=
∂hi(S)
∂S
hi(S)
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt
−
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂w¯(t−S)∂t
w¯(t− S)(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt
− e−
∫ S
x0
r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, S)`i(S). (D.37)
Therefore, after rearranging terms, the optimal length of schooling satisfies the
following condition
∂hi(S)
∂S
hi(S)
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt
=
∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂w¯(t−S)∂t
w¯(t− S)(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt
+ e
− ∫ Sx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, S)`i(S)
+ e
− ∫ Sx0 r+µi(j)dj η − αiv(`i(S))
λa(x0)
. (D.38)
Defining human capital at age S net of effective labor income taxes as
Wi(S,Ri) =
∫ Ri
S
e−
∫ t
S r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)dt (D.39)
and dividing both sides of (D.38) by Wi(S,Ri), multiplying by e
∫ S
x0
r+µi(j)dj , we
obtain the optimal length of schooling condition
rhi (S) = r¯i(S,Ri) +
η − αiv(`i(S))
U ′(ci(S))Wi(S,Ri)
. (D.40)
rhi (S) is the return to education at age S for an individual of type i
rhi (S) =
1
hi(S)
∂hi(S)
∂S
, (D.41)
r¯i(S,R) is the rate of return lost from not working at age S or the marginal cost
of the Sth unit of schooling for an individual of type i
r¯i(S,Ri) =
∫ Ri
S
∂w¯(t−S)
∂t
w¯(t− S)ψi(t)dt+ ψi(S), (D.42)
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where
ψi(t) =
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(S, t)`i(t)∫ Ri
S
e
− ∫ ux0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(u))wi(S, u)`i(u)du. (D.43)
From (D.42) and (D.43) we have
∫ Ri
S
ψi(t)dt = 1 and limS→Ri r¯i(S,Ri) = 1.
D.3 Optimal retirement age (Ri)
Similar to the previous subsection we start assuming that the optimal length of
schooling Si is given. Then, we differentiate the expected utility Vi(x0) w.r.t. the
optimal retirement age R and equate the result to the derivative of the lifetime
budget constrain w.r.t. to the optimal retirement age.
Proof. Given an optimal length of schooling Si we first differentiate the expected
utility Vi(x0) w.r.t. R and making it equal to zero∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djU ′ (ci(t)) ∂ci(t)
∂R
dt− αi
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 ρ+µi(j)djv′ (`i(t)) ∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
= e
− ∫Rx0 ρ+µi(j)dj (αiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R)) . (D.44)
Substituting the FOCs in the previous equation gives∫ ω
x0
λa(t)
∂ci(t)
∂R
dt−
∫ R
Si
λa(t)(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
= e
− ∫Rx0 ρ+µi(j)dj (αiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R)) . (D.45)
Using the envelope conditions on assets, which gives λa(t) =
λa(x0)e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj , dividing both sides of the equation by λa(x0) and
rearranging terms gives∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂R
dt−
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
= e
− ∫Rx0 ρ+µi(j)djαiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R)
λa(x0)
. (D.46)
Second, we differentiate the budget constraint (10) at age x0 w.r.t. R∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂R
dt =
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djwi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
+ e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)djwi(Si, R)`i(R) + ∂SSWi(x0)
∂R
. (D.47)
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Differentiating (B.7) at age x0 with respect to R gives
∂SSWi(x0)
∂R
= −
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
− e−
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(R))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ ∂Pi(t)
∂R
wi(Si, t)`i(t)dt. (D.48)
Now, by differentiating (5) with respect to R we have
∂Pi(t)
∂R
= Pi(t)
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
+
1
Ai(R, r)
∂Ai(R, r)
∂R
+ r˜ + µ˜(R)− (r + µi(R))
)
= Pi(t)
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ r˜ + µ˜(R)
)
. (D.49)
Given that fi(R) depends on both R and pp, the total derivative of fi(R) with
respect to R is
∂fi(R)
∂R
=
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
+
∂fi(R)
∂ppi(R)
∂ppi(R)
∂R
. (D.50)
Thus, from (15) and (D.50), Eq. (D.49) can be rewritten as follow
∂Pi(t)
∂R
= Pi(t)
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ r˜ + µ˜(R)
)
− Pi(t)εi 1ppi(R)
∂ppi(R)
∂R
.
(D.51)
Substituting (D.51) on (D.48) we get
∂SSWi(x0)
∂R
= −
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
− e−
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(R))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ r˜ + µ˜(R)
)∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτPi(t)wi(Si, t)`i(t)dt
− 1
ppi(R)
∂pp(R)
∂R
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτPi(t)εiwi(Si, t)`i(t)dt. (D.52)
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Using the relation Pi(t) = Pi(R)e
∫R
t r˜+µ˜(j)−(r+µi(j))dj in the last two terms of
(D.52), and rearranging terms, we have
∂SSWi(x0)
∂R
= −
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
− e−
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(R))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+ e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ r˜ + µ˜(R)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
− e−
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)dj ∂pp(R)
∂R
Pi(R)εi
φ
. (D.53)
Now, from (B.2) we differentiate the total pension points at age R with respect
to R, i.e. ∂pp(R)
∂R
, which gives
∂ppi(Ri)
∂S
=
∫ R
Si
e
∫R
t r˜+µ˜(j)djφτwi(S, t)
∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))ppi(R) + φτwi(Si, R)`i(R). (D.54)
Plugging (D.54) in (D.53) and rearranging terms gives
∂SSWi(x0)
∂R
= −
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(t)(1− εi))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
− e−
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)djτ(1− Pi(R)(1− εi))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))(1− εi)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
.
(D.55)
Next, plugging (D.55) in (D.47) gives∫ ω
x0
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj ∂ci(t)
∂R
dt−
∫ R
Si
e
− ∫ tx0 r+µi(j)dj(1−τ+τP i(t))wi(Si, t)∂`i(t)
∂R
dt
= e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj(1− τ + τP i(t))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))(1− εi)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
.
(D.56)
14
Using the fact that the left-hand side of (D.3) and (D.56) are equal, we obtain
e
− ∫Rx0 ρ+µi(j)djαiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R)
λa(x0)
= e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj(1−τ+τP i(t))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+e
− ∫Rx0 r+µi(j)dj
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))(1− εi)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
.
(D.57)
Multiplying both sides of (D.57) by e
∫R
x0
r+µi(j)dj gives
e(r−ρ)(R−x0)
αiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R)
λa(x0)
= (1− τ + τP i(t))wi(Si, R)`i(R)
+
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))(1− εi)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
.
(D.58)
Defining the implicit tax rate on retirement τGWi (R) as
τGWi (R) = τ(1− P i(t))
−
(
1
fi(R)
∂fi(R)
∂R
∣∣∣∣
pp
− 1
Ai(R, r)
+ (˜r + µ˜(R))(1− εi)
)
Pi(R)
ppi(R)
φ
wi(Si, R)`i(R)
,
(D.59)
where the first term is the implicit tax paid by working one additional period and
the second term is the relative change in the social security wealth caused by
postponing the retirement age.
Then, using (D.59) and the fact that U ′(ci(R)) = e−(r−ρ)(R−x0)λa(x0) we obtain
that the optimal retirement age condition satisfies
αiv (`i(R)) + ϕ(R) = U
′(ci(R))wi(Si, R)`i(R)(1− τGWi (R)), (D.60)
which coincides with (18).
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E Additional simulated data
Length of schooling Si.
Table 6: Optimal length of schooling by income quintile (Si), US male birth cohorts
1930 and 1960
Defined Contribution (NDC) Defined Benefit
Avg. LT Corrected i–th LT Non– Progressive Progressive
Avg. LT progressive Corrected
NDC-I NDC-II NDC-III DB-I DB-II DB-III
Cohort 1930
Quintile 1 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.9 11.3 11.3
Quintile 2 11.8 11.8 11.9 12.3 11.8 11.7
Quintile 3 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.9 12.3 12.3
Quintile 4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.6 13.2 13.3
Quintile 5 15.8 15.7 15.7 15.9 14.2 14.3
Cohort 1960
Quintile 1 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 10.6 10.4
Quintile 2 12.4 12.5 12.6 13.0 12.2 12.4
Quintile 3 15.7 15.7 15.7 16.3 14.7 14.9
Quintile 4 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 17.2 17.4
Quintile 5 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 17.5 17.7
Retirement ages Ri.
Table 7: Optimal retirement age by income quintile (Ri), US male birth cohorts
1930 and 1960
Defined Contribution (NDC) Defined Benefit
Avg. LT Corrected i–th LT Non– Progressive Progressive
Avg. LT progressive Corrected
NDC-I NDC-II NDC-III DB-I DB-II DB-III
Cohort 1930
Quintile 1 60.9 60.9 61.1 63.2 62.7 62.8
Quintile 2 61.5 61.5 61.7 63.8 63.3 63.3
Quintile 3 62.5 62.5 62.5 64.6 64.0 64.1
Quintile 4 64.6 64.6 64.5 65.3 64.7 64.7
Quintile 5 66.8 66.6 66.4 67.1 65.2 65.2
Cohort 1960
Quintile 1 60.1 60.2 60.6 62.0† 62.0† 62.0†
Quintile 2 62.2 62.4 62.7 64.8 63.4 64.7
Quintile 3 67.3 67.5 67.4 69.8 68.4 68.6
Quintile 4 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
Quintile 5 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0
Notes: Symbol ‘†’ represents cases in which individuals exit the labor market before they start claiming
retirement benefits. In particular, individuals subject to the mortality regime of the 1960 cohort retire on
average at age 61.1 in the DB-I system, 60.5 in the DB-II system and at age 60.4 in the DB-III system.
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Hours worked `i.
Table 8: Average optimal hours worked over the working life by income quintile
(Si), US male birth cohorts 1930 and 1960
Defined Contribution (NDC) Defined Benefit
Avg. LT Corrected i–th LT Non– Progressive Progressive
Avg. LT progressive Corrected
NDC-I NDC-II NDC-III DB-I DB-II DB-III
Cohort 1930
Quintile 1 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.252 0.250 0.250
Quintile 2 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.267 0.265 0.265
Quintile 3 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.277 0.275 0.275
Quintile 4 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.285 0.280 0.280
Quintile 5 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.282 0.283
Cohort 1960
Quintile 1 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.252 0.250 0.249
Quintile 2 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.268 0.266 0.266
Quintile 3 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.282 0.278 0.278
Quintile 4 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.286 0.287
Quintile 5 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.287 0.288
Present value of lifetime benefits.
Table 9: Present value of lifetime benefits at age 50 by income quintile and pension
system, US males, birth cohorts 1930 and 1960 (in $1 000s)
Defined Contribution (NDC) Defined Benefit (DB)
Avg. LT Corrected i–th LT Non– Progressive Progressive
Avg. LT progressive Corrected
NDC-I NDC-II NDC-III DB-I DB-II DB-III
Cohort 1930
Quintile 1 127.02 138.55 147.60 133.83 132.05 142.90
Quintile 2 143.21 153.11 161.27 154.97 149.70 157.25
Quintile 3 163.27 169.63 173.41 182.28 170.34 175.56
Quintile 4 217.69 214.81 211.62 240.67 197.60 193.42
Quintile 5 270.78 247.35 234.01 300.49 224.57 205.72
Cohort 1960
Quintile 1 117.55 155.42 177.58 95.91 107.58 136.57
Quintile 2 150.46 188.10 208.66 146.66 143.91 182.55
Quintile 3 253.62 270.85 274.81 307.32 258.47 270.30
Quintile 4 408.52 376.59 358.61 474.74 356.91 320.30
Quintile 5 431.70 385.33 363.10 501.68 375.31 326.15
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Lifetime wealth.
Table 10: Distribution of lifetime wealth (LW) at age 14 by income quintile and
mortality regime in the NDC-III system (in $1 000s)
Cohort 1930 Cohort 1960
SSW HK LW SSW HK LW
I II III=I+II I II III=I+II
Quintile 1 -15.61 503.23 487.62 -18.51 489.98 471.48
Quintile 2 -17.24 554.66 537.42 -22.67 594.77 572.10
Quintile 3 -18.84 604.38 585.53 -32.24 826.47 794.22
Quintile 4 -22.96 740.85 717.89 -43.29 1 108.48 1 065.20
Quintile 5 -26.31 842.44 816.14 -44.25 1 129.04 1 084.79
Notes: SSW stands for social security wealth, HK denotes the stock of human capital, and LW is
the lifetime wealth.
Table 10 reports the lifetime wealth (detrended by productivity) by income quin-
tile relative to that obtained for the income group q3 under the mortality regime
1930. We can see in Tab. 10 that the higher income quintiles q3–q5 experience
an average increase over twenty percent in their lifetime wealth with the more
unequal mortality regime, q2 experiences an increase of seven percent in the life-
time wealth, and q1 has five percent less wealth. Moreover, since the NDC-III
system provides the same internal rate of return across income groups, we have
that the ratio between the social security wealth and the stock of human capital
is the same across income group.
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Behavioral effects
Figure 6 shows the difference in lifetime wealth between a model with and with-
out behavioral reactions by pension system and mortality regime. Figure 6 shows
that those in the highest income quintiles experience a significant increase in
their stock of human capital (HK) when they react to demographic and economic
changes, while those in the lowest income quintiles experience almost no change
in their stock of human capital.
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Figure 6: Impact of behavior on lifetime wealth by income quintile and pension
system. US males, mortality regimes of birth cohorts 1930 (top panels) and 1960
(bottom panels).
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Figure 7 shows the welfare difference of a model with behavioral reactions rel-
ative to that without behavioral reactions for each pension system and mortal-
ity regime. This figure clearly shows that when individuals of different quintiles
can optimally react to changes in the economic environment, those with higher
income and longer life expectancy experience welfare gains, while those with
lower income and shorter life expectancy either have small welfare gains in NDC
systems or have welfare losses in DB systems. The lower increase in welfare for
those in quintile 5 relative to those in quintile 4 is caused by the upper bound in
the retirement age.
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Figure 7: Impact of behavior on welfare by income quintile and pension system.
US males, mortality regimes of birth cohorts 1930 (top panels) and 1960 (bottom
panels).
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